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ABSTRACT
e recent proliferation of human-carriedmobile devices has given
rise to mobile crowd sensing (MCS) systems that outsource sen-
sory data collection to the public crowd. In order to identify truth-
ful values from (crowd) workers’ noisy or even conflicting sen-
sory data, truth discovery algorithms, which jointly estimate work-
ers’ data quality and the underlying truths through quality-aware
data aggregation, have drawn significant aention. However, the
power of these algorithms could not be fully unleashed in MCS
systems, unless workers’ strategic reduction of their sensing effort
is properly tackled. To address this issue, in this paper, we propose
a payment mechanism, named eseus, that deals with workers’
such strategic behavior, and incentivizes high-effort sensing from
workers. We ensure that, at the Bayesian Nash Equilibrium of the
non-cooperative game induced by eseus, all participating work-
ers will spend theirmaximum possible effort on sensing, which im-
proves their data quality. As a result, the aggregated results calcu-
lated subsequently by truth discovery algorithms based on work-
ers’ data will be highly accurate. Additionally, eseus bears other
desirable properties, including individual rationality and budget
feasibility. We validate the desirable properties ofeseus through
theoretical analysis, as well as extensive simulations.
1 INTRODUCTION
e recent proliferation of increasingly capable human-carried
mobile devices (e.g., smartphones, smartwatches, smartglasses)
equipped with a plethora of on-board sensors (e.g., accelerome-
ter, compass, gyroscope, GPS, camera) has given rise to mobile
crowd sensing (MCS), a new sensing paradigm which outsources
sensory data collection to a crowd of participants, namely (crowd)
workers. us far, a wide spectrum of MCS systems [1–5] have
been deployed which cover almost every aspect of our lives, in-
cluding smart transportation, healthcare, environmental monitor-
ing, indoor localization, and many others.
In real practice, workers’ sensory data are usually unreliable be-
cause of various factors (e.g., lack of effort, insufficient skill, poor
sensor quality, background noise). us, the crowd sensing plat-
form, which is usually a cloud-based central server, has to properly
aggregate workers’ noisy or even conflicting data so as to obtain ac-
curate aggregated results. Clearly, a weighted aggregation method
that assigns higher weights to workers with more reliable data is
∗We gratefully acknowledge the support of National Science Foundation grants CNS-
1330491, 1566374, and 1652503.
much more favorable than naive methods (e.g., averaging and vot-
ing) that view each worker equally, in that it shis the aggregated
results towards the data provided by more reliable workers.
e challenge, however, is that workers’ reliability is usually
unknown a priori by the platform, and should be inferred from
the sensory data submied by individual workers. To address this
issue, truth discovery, which refers to a family of algorithms [6–
9] that aim to discover meaningful facts from unreliable data, has
been proposed and widely studied. Without any prior knowledge
about workers’ reliability, a truth discovery algorithm calculates
jointly workers’ weights and the aggregated results, based on the
principles that the workers whose data are closer to the aggregated
results will be assigned higher weights, and the data from aworker
with a higher weight will be counted more in the aggregation.
ough yielding reasonably good performance under certain
circumstances, truth discovery algorithms still suffer from the limi-
tation that the aggregation accuracy highly depends on the quality
of input data. If a vast majority of the data sources are unreliable,
it will be hard or even impossible for these algorithms to obtain
accurate aggregated results. is is exactly why past literature on
truth discovery [6–9] assumes that most data sources have fairly
good reliability. However, in MCS systems, such assumption does
not hold, as the data sources here are selfish workers, who may
strategically reduce their costly sensing effort, such as the time, re-
sources, aention, and carefulness they put into the sensing tasks.
Clearly, the level of a worker’s sensing effort is among the major
factors that affect her data quality. e reduction of workers’ effort
inevitably deteriorates the quality of their sensory data, which fur-
ther impairs the aggregation accuracy. For example, in air quality
monitoring applications [2], in order to save effort, workers may
carry their mobile devices in their pockets instead of holding them
on their hands as required, which may significantly degrade the
reliability of their air quality measurements. erefore, the power
of truth discovery algorithms could not be fully unleashed in MCS
systems, unless the platform properly deals with workers’ strategic
reduction of sensing effort.
To address this issue, in this paper, we take into consideration
workers’ strategic behavior, and propose a payment mechanism,
named eseus1, that offers payments to incentivize high-effort
sensing from workers. Our workflow of an MCS system starts
with the platform announcing theeseus payment mechanism to
workers before all the sensing happens. Workers’ strategic behav-
ior aer the announcement ofeseus is thenmodeled using game-
theoretic methods. In our model, eseus induces a non-cooperative
1e name eseus comes from incenTivizing truth discovery with strategic data
sources.
game2, called sensing game, where workers are the players who
strategically decide their levels of effort for sensing. In order to
elicit effort fromworkers, eseus is then designed such that at the
Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (BNE) of the sensing game, each par-
ticipating worker maximizes her expected utility only when she
spends her maximum possible effort. Clearly, eseus improves
the quality of workers’ data by controlling a critical factor, that
is, the level of their sensing effort. As a result, the aggregated re-
sults calculated subsequently by truth discovery algorithms based
on workers’ sensory data will be of high accuracy.
In summary, this paper makes the following contributions.
• In this paper, we propose a payment mechanism, calledeseus,
which is used in pair with a truth discovery algorithm to ensure
high aggregation accuracy in MCS systems where workers may
strategically reduce their effort for sensing.
• Oureseus payment mechanism deals with workers’ strategic
behavior by incentivizing workers to spend their maximum pos-
sible sensing effort at the BNE of the induced non-cooperative
game among them.
• Additionally, we ensure thateseus bears other desirable prop-
erties, including individual rationality and budget feasibility.
2 RELATED WORK
In order to identify truthful values from workers’ noisy or even
conflicting sensory data in MCS systems, truth discovery algo-
rithms [6–9], which jointly estimate workers’ data quality and the
underlying truths through quality-aware data aggregation, have
drawn significant aention. However, these algorithms usually can-
not deal with workers’ strategic reduction of sensing effort, and thus,
may yield unsatisfactory aggregation accuracy.
Another line of prior work related to this paper is a series of
incentive mechanisms [10–42] recently developed by the research
community in order to stimulate worker participation in MCS sys-
tems. Most of these past literature [10–36] adopts game-theoretic
methods, due to their ability to deal with workers’ strategic behav-
ior. Among them, auction-based incentive mechanisms [17–31]
typically consider workers’ strategic bidding of the prices and sens-
ing task choices to the platform. Furthermore, some prior work
[32–35] tackles workers’ strategic manipulation of reported pri-
vate and sensitive data due to privacy concerns. However, none
of them study workers’ strategic reduction of sensing effort as in this
work. Mechanisms that elicit effort from crowd workers have been
investigated in past literature [10–17], but none of them is designed
to work in pair with truth discovery algorithms. Note that although
one existing incentive mechanism [42] is able to work jointly with
truth discovery algorithms, it is not based on game-theoretic mod-
els, and thus, cannot tackle workers’ strategic behavior.
Different from existing work, in this paper, we design a payment
mechanism, which is used in pair with a truth discovery algorithm
to ensure high aggregation accuracy by incentivizing workers to
spend their maximum possible sensing effort.
2Non-cooperative game refers to the family of games, where each player acts indepen-
dently without collaboration or communication with others, whereas, in cooperative
games, players may communicate with each other and form coalitions.
3 PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we introduce the system overview, truth discovery
algorithms, our game theoretic model, as well as the design objec-
tives.
3.1 System Overview
We consider an MCS system consisting of a cloud-based platform,
and a set of S potential participating workers, denoted as S =
{1, 2 · · · , S}. e platform holds a set ofM sensing tasks, denoted
as M = {1, 2, · · · ,M}, and each task requires workers to sense a
particular object, event, or phenomenon locally, and report to the
platform the sensory data in the form of continuous values. Such
MCS systems collecting continuous data from the crowd, consti-
tute a large portionof the currently deployedMCS systems, such as
environmental monitoring applications that collect air quality or
noise level measurements from participating workers. We demon-
strate the interaction between the platform and workers in Figure
1, and describe the complete workflow of our MCS system model
as follows.
Cloud-based 
Platform
P
a
y
m
en
t 
M
ec
h
a
n
is
m
1
S
en
so
ry
 D
a
ta
2
P
a
y
m
en
t
3
Workers
Workflow
…
…
…
P
a
y
m
en
t 
M
ec
h
a
n
is
m
1
S
en
so
ry
 D
a
ta
2
P
a
y
m
en
t
3
P
a
y
m
en
t 
M
ec
h
a
n
is
m
1
S
en
so
ry
 D
a
ta
2
P
a
y
m
en
t
3
Figure 1: Interaction between the platform and workers
(where circled numbers represent the order of the events).
• Firstly, the platform announces the set of sensing tasks M , as
well as the payment mechanism, to the set of all potential par-
ticipating workers S (step 1 ).
• Aer such announcements, each worker s ∈ S decides whether
or not to participate in the sensing tasks. en, the workers
that choose to participate decide the levels of their sensing ef-
fort (e.g., time, resources, aention, carefulness), and carry out
sensing according to the decided effort levels. We denote the
set of participating workers as S′ ⊆ S. Each worker s ∈ S′
then submits to the platform the sensory data xsm for each task
m ∈ M upon completion of sensing3 (step 2 ).
• Aer receiving workers’ data, the platform pays each partici-
pating worker according to the payment calculated using the
payment mechanism (step 3 ).
• Finally, based on the collected data, the platform calculates an
aggregated result x∗m for each taskm, and uses it as an estimate
for the ground truth xtruthm , which is unknown to both the plat-
form and the workers.
3Clearly, in practice, each individual worker may not be able to execute all the sensing
tasks hosted by the platform. us, a more realistic model is to introduce an affinity
term for each worker-task pair (s,m) that indicates whether or not worker s is able
to execute taskm. However, to simplify the presentation of our subsequent mathe-
matical analyses, we assume that each worker is capable to execute all the tasks.
As the quality of different workers’ sensory data typically varies,
an ideal approach is to use a weighted aggregation scheme which
assigns higher weights to workers with higher data quality. How-
ever, in practice, workers’ data quality is usually unknown a priori
to the platform. erefore, in our model, the platform utilizes one
of the truth discovery algorithms [6–9] to aggregate workers’ data,
which calculates workers’ weights and estimates the ground truths
in a joint manner. An introduction of such algorithms is provided
in the following Section 3.2.
3.2 Truth Discovery
Although existing truth discovery algorithms [6–9] differ in their
specific ways to calculate workers’ weights and the aggregated re-
sults, their common procedure could be summarized as in the fol-
lowing Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1: Truth Discovery Algorithm
Input: Workers’ data {x sm |m ∈ M, s ∈ S′ };
Output: Estimated ground truths {x ∗m |m ∈ M};
1 Randomly initialize the ground truth for each task;
2 repeat
// Weight calculation
3 foreach s ∈ S′ do
4 Update the weight ws based on current estimated ground
truths using Equation (1);
// Truth estimation
5 foreachm ∈ M do
6 Update the estimated ground truth x ∗m based on workers’
current weights using Equation (2);
7 until Convergence criterion is satisfied;
8 return Estimated ground truths {x ∗m |m ∈ M};
A truth discovery algorithm, as described in Algorithm 1, typ-
ically starts with a random guess of tasks’ ground truths, and
then iteratively updates workers’ weights, as well as the estimated
ground truths until convergence.
Weight Calculation. In this step, tasks’ estimated ground
truths are assumed to be fixed, and the weight ws of each worker
s ∈ S′ is calculated as
ws = ω
( ∑
m∈M
d(xsm ,x∗m )
)
, (1)
where ω(·) is some monotonically decreasing function, and d(·)
denotes the function that calculates the distance between the
worker’s data xsm and the estimated ground truth x
∗
m . Although
different truth discovery algorithms may adopt different functions
ω(·) and d(·), they share the same underlying principle that higher
weights are assigned to workers whose data are closer to the esti-
mated ground truths.
Truth Estimation. In this step, workers’ weights are assumed
to be fixed, and the estimated ground truth x∗m of each task m is
derived as
x∗m =
∑
s ∈S′ wsxsm∑
s ∈S′ ws
. (2)
In such weighted aggregation method, the aggregated result x∗m
relies more on the workers with higher weights. Usually, the con-
vergence criterion is application specific. For example, the algo-
rithm could be treated as converged as long as the difference be-
tween the estimated ground truths in two consecutive iterations is
less than a threshold.
Note that the payment mechanism that we propose in this paper
is independent with the specific forms of the functionsω(·) andd(·)
in Equation (1). erefore, it is able to work jointly with any truth
discovery algorithm that shares the same procedure as Algorithm
1. Further discussions on this point will be provided in Section 4.
3.3 Gameeoretic Model
As the aggregation accuracy of truth discovery algorithms highly
depends on the quality of input data, existing work on truth dis-
covery [6–9] assumes that most data sources have fairly good reli-
ability. In MCS systems, however, such assumption does not hold,
as the data sources here are usually strategic and selfish workers,
who may reduce their sensing effort strategically, and thus, pro-
vide unreliable data.
In this paper, we take into consideration workers’ strategic be-
havior, and incentivize workers to provide high quality data using
a payment mechanism defined in Definition 1.
Definition 1 (Payment Mechanism). A payment mechanism,
denoted as p : X → RS , where X denotes the set containing all pos-
sible sets of workers’ sensory data, calculates the payments to workers
based on the collected set of data x = {xsm |m ∈ M, s ∈ S′}. We use
ps (x) ≥ 0 to denote the payment to worker s , when the set of collected
data is x. Note that ps (x) = 0, if worker s drops out.
As mentioned in Section 3.1, the platform firstly announces to
workers the payment mechanism p(·), which then induces a non-
cooperative game4, referred to as sensing game in the rest of this
paper, where workers are the players. In this game, each worker
decides whether or not to participate by evaluating her own ex-
pected utility. at is, a worker s will drop out, if participation
leads to a negative expected utility, and otherwise, she will par-
ticipate with a specific effort level es that maximizes her expected
utility. Similar to past literature [6, 43], we assume that the differ-
ence between any worker s’s data and the ground truth follows a
zero-mean Gaussian distribution, i.e.,
X sm − X truthm ∼ N (0,δ2s ), (3)
where X sm and X
truth
m are the random variables corresponding to
xsm and the ground truth x
truth
m respectively, and N (0,δ2s ) denotes a
Gaussian random variable with mean zero and standard deviation
δs . Although we assume that such difference follows a Gaussian
distribution, the results in this paper could be generalized, with
some adaptation, to scenarios with other types of distributions.
Clearly, the standard deviation δs captures a worker s’s data qual-
ity, as the less the value of δs , the more likely that her sensory data
will be close to the ground truth.
As a worker’s data quality typically increases with her effort
level, we assume that δs = qs (es ) ∈ [δs ,δ s ] for each worker s ,
where qs (·) is a bounded monotonically non-increasing function.
4Refer to Footnote 2 for definition.
We allow, in our model, workers to have different qs (·) functions
and ranges for their δs ’s, because apart from a worker’s effort, her
data quality is also affected by other factors (e.g., skill level, sensor
quality, environment noise). As each worker s is assigned a single
weight ws in the truth discovery algorithm adopted by us (Algo-
rithm 1), we assume that she spends the same amount of effort es
on all the tasks. We leave the study of the scenario where workers
have different effort levels on different tasks in our future work.
For simplicity, we use δs instead of es as a worker s’s strategy,
and use δs = ⊥ to denote that the worker chooses to drop out.
us, a worker s’s strategy space is [δ s , δ s ] ∪ {⊥}. As given by
Equation (3), the distribution of any worker s’s data depends on
δs , we use x(δ) to denote the set of collected data, and X(δ) the
random variable corresponding to x(δ), when workers’ strategy
profile is δ = (δ1, δ2, · · · ,δS ). en, we define a worker’s utility in
Definition 2.
Definition 2 (Worker’s Utility). Given the payment mech-
anism p(·) and workers’ strategy profile δ = (δ1,δ2, · · · , δS ), any
worker s’s utility is
us (δ) = ps
(
x(δ)) −Cs (δs ), (4)
where Cs (·) is a monotonically decreasing function for δs ∈ [δs ,δ s ],
and Cs (⊥) = 0. Cs (δs ) denotes worker s’s sensing cost when her
strategy is δs . erefore, the expected utility of worker s (evaluated
by worker s) is
Eδ−s
[
us (δs ,δ−s )
]
= Eδ−s
[
ps
(
X(δs ,δ−s )
) ] −Cs (δs ), (5)
where δ−s = (δ1, · · · , δs−1,δs+1, · · · ,δS ) denotes workers’ strategy
profile excluding δs .
In general cases, the calculation of a worker s’s expected utility
in Equation (5) requires the knowledge of the joint distribution of
δ−s . However, because of the specific design of our payment mech-
anism described in Section 5, the calculation can be done without
knowing such joint distribution. We leave the detailed discussion
on the required prior statistical knowledge in Section 6.
3.4 Design Objectives
In this paper, we aim to design a payment mechanism which pre-
serves several desirable properties at the Bayesian Nash Equilib-
rium (BNE), formally defined in Definition 3, of the sensing game.
Definition 3 (BNE). e strategy profile δ∗ = (δ∗1 , δ∗2 , · · · , δ∗S )
is a Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (BNE) of the sensing game, if
Eδ
∗
−s
[
us (δ∗s ,δ∗−s )
] ≥ Eδ∗−s [us (δs ,δ∗−s )] ,∀s ∈ S,δs , (6)
where δ∗−s = (δ∗1 , · · · ,δ∗s−1, δ∗s+1, · · · , δ∗S ).
Clearly, BNE δ∗ satisfies that any worker s maximizes her ex-
pected utility by taking strategy δ∗s given that other workers take
strategies δ∗−s . One desirable property we aim to achieve is indi-
vidual rationality defined in Definition 4.
Definition 4 (Individual Rationality). A payment mecha-
nism p(·) is individual rational, if and only if no worker has negative
expected utility at BNE δ∗, i.e.,
Eδ
∗
−s
[
us (δ∗s ,δ∗−s )
] ≥ 0,∀s ∈ S. (7)
e property of individual rationality is necessary for a payment
mechanism, as it prevents workers from being disincentivized to
participate. Because usually, in practice, the platform works un-
der a fixed budget, another design objective considered is budget
feasibility defined in Definition 5.
Definition 5 (Budget Feasibility). A payment mechanism
p(·) is budget feasible, if and only if the expected overall payment
at BNE δ∗ does not exceed the budget B, i.e.,
Eδ
∗
[ ∑
s ∈S′
ps
(
X(δ∗))] ≤ B. (8)
Another critical desirable property is that workers at BNE pro-
vide high quality data, so that the truth discovery algorithm en-
sures low error probability, which is defined in Definition 6.
Definition 6 (Error Probability). Given any α > 0, we define
the error probability of a truth discovery algorithm as
Pr
(
1
M
M∑
m=1
X ∗m − X truthm  ≥ α
)
, (9)
where X ∗m denotes the random variable corresponding to the esti-
mated ground truth x∗m . Clearly, it is the probability that the mean
absolute error (MAE), 1M
∑M
m=1
X ∗m − X truthm , of a truth discovery
algorithm is no less than a given threshold α .
In summary, our objective is to design an individual rational and
budget feasible payment mechanism, which ensures that the truth
discovery algorithm guarantees low error probability at BNE.
4 MATHEMATICAL FORMULATION
In this section, we formally formulate the payment mechanism de-
sign problem mathematically. Firstly, we introduce the following
Lemma 1 that establishes an upper bound for the error probability
of a truth discovery algorithm defined in Definition 6.
Lemma 1. Given any α > 0 and workers’ strategy profile δ =
(δ1,δ2, · · · , δS ), we have that
Pr
(
1
M
M∑
m=1
X ∗m − X truthm  ≥ α
)
≤
√
2
pi
∑
s ∈S′ δs
α
, (10)
that is, the error probability of a truth discovery algorithm is upper
bounded by
√
2
π
∑
s∈S′ δs
α .
Proof. e MAE of a truth discovery algorithm satisfies that
1
M
M∑
m=1
X ∗m − X truthm  = 1M
M∑
m=1
∑s ∈S′ wsX sm∑
s ∈S′ ws
− X truthm

=
1
M
M∑
m=1

∑
s ∈S′ ws
(
X sm − X truthm
)∑
s ∈S′ ws

≤ 1
M
∑M
m=1
∑
s ∈S′ ws
X sm − X truthm ∑
s ∈S′ ws
=
1
M
∑
s ∈S′ ws
( ∑M
m=1
X sm − X truthm )∑
s ∈S′ ws
≤
∑
s ∈S′
1
M
M∑
m=1
X sm − X truthm .
As X sm − X truthm ∼ N (0,δ2s ), we have that E
[X sm − X truthm ] =√
2
π δs . us, given any α > 0, we have that
Pr
(
1
M
M∑
m=1
X ∗m − X truthm  ≥ α
)
≤ Pr
( ∑
s∈S′
1
M
M∑
m=1
X sm − X truthm  ≥ α
)
(Markov’s Inequality) ≤ E
[ ∑
s∈S′ 1M
∑
M
m=1
X sm − X truthm ]
α
=
∑
s∈S′
1
M
∑
M
m=1 E
[X sm − X truthm ]
α
=
√
2
π
∑
s∈S′ δs
α
,
which is exactly Inequality (10). 
Given any fixed α , the upper bound of the error probability of
a truth discovery algorithm given by Lemma 1 is proportional to∑
s ∈S′ δs , i.e., the sum of all participating workers’ δs ’s. us, we
aim to minimize
∑
s ∈S′ δ∗s in order to get a good guarantee for
the error probability at BNE δ∗ = (δ∗1 ,δ∗2 , · · · , δ∗S ). e formal
mathematical formulation of the paymentmechanism design (PMD)
problem is given in the following optimization program.
PMD Problem:
min
p(·)∈P
∑
s ∈S′
δ∗s (11)
s.t. Eδ∗−s
[
us (δ∗s ,δ∗−s )
] ≥ 0, ∀s ∈ S (12)
Eδ
∗
[ ∑
s ∈S′
ps
(
X(δ∗))] ≤ B (13)
Constants.e PMD problem takes as inputs the worker set S,
the budget B, as well as the set P , which denotes the set consisting
of all the possible payment mechanisms, such that a BNE exists for
the corresponding sensing game.
Variable. e variable of the PMD problem is the payment
mechanism p(·). Furthermore, δ∗ denotes the BNE corresponding
to p(·), and S′ and X(δ∗) denote, respectively, the set of partici-
pating workers and collected sensory data at the BNE δ∗. Note
that as δ∗, δ∗s , δ∗−s , and S′ in the PMD problem are determined by
p(·), more comprehensive notations of them are δ∗(p(·)), δ∗s (p(·)),
δ
∗−s (p(·)), and S′(p(·)), respectively. For simplicity, however, we
denote them as δ∗, δ∗s , δ∗−s , and S′ as in the PMD problem.
Objective function. e objective (Equation (11)) of the PMD
problem is to find the payment mechanism from P with the mini-
mum
∑
s ∈S′ δ∗s at the corresponding BNE δ∗, which is equivalent
to minimizing the upper bound, as derived in Lemma 1, of a truth
discovery algorithm’s error probability at BNE for a fixed α .
Constraints. Constraint (12) and (13) ensure, respectively, that
any feasible solution p(·) to the PMD problem satisfies individual
rationality and budget feasibility.
us, the PMD problem aims to find the individual rational and
budget feasible payment mechanism, which minimizes the upper
bound (given by Lemma 1) of a truth discovery algorithm’s error
probability at the corresponding BNE for any fixed α . Clearly, our
formulation of the PMD problem is valid for an arbitrary way of
assigning workers’ weights. erefore, the above formulation and
the proposed payment mechanism to be presented in the following
section can be applied to any truthdiscovery algorithm that has the
same procedure as Algorithm 1.
5 PROPOSED PAYMENT MECHANISM
As solving directly the optimal payment mechanism is hard, in
this section, we propose our own payment mechanism, namede-
seus, in Algorithm 2, which approximately solves the PMD prob-
lem with good performance guarantees.
Algorithm 2:eseus Payment Mechanism
Input: M, S, S′, x, {(as, bs ) |s ∈ S};
Output: {ps |s ∈ S};
1 foreach worker s ∈ S do
2 if s ∈ S′ then
3 Randomly pick another worker r ∈ S′;
4 ps ← bs − as 1M
∑
M
m=1(x sm − x rm )2 ;
5 else
6 ps ← 0;
7 return {ps |s ∈ S};
Algorithm 2 takes as inputs the set of tasksM , workers S, and
participating workers S′, as well as the set of collected sensory
data x, and {(as ,bs )|s ∈ S} where as and bs are positive parame-
ters related to the payment to worker s . e calculation of the pay-
ment to any participating worker (line 2-4) borrows the high-level
idea of the peer prediction method [44], which basically decides
the payment based on the difference between her data and that of
a randomly selected reference worker. at is, if worker s partici-
pates (i.e., s ∈ S′), Algorithm 2 randomly picks another reference
worker r from the set of participating workers S′ (line 3). Next,
the payment ps to this worker s is set as
ps = bs − as 1
M
M∑
m=1
(xsm − xrm )2. (14)
Clearly, the more worker s’s data agrees with that of the randomly
selected reference worker r , the higher her payment ps will be. If
any worker s drops out (i.e., s < S′), the algorithm will set her
payment as 0 (line 6). Finally, the algorithm returns the set of pay-
ments to all workers {ps |s ∈ S} (line 7). By now, our description
of eseus has been finished except for one missing piece, that is,
how the parameters {(as ,bs )|s ∈ S} are set, which is presented in
the following Section 6.
Clearly, another intuitive way of deciding the payment ps to
each participating worker s is to set ps to be positively correlated
to her weightws calculated by the truth discovery algorithm using
Equation (1). However, we do not adopt this approach due to the
difficulty in analyzing the properties of the induced sensing game.
6 PARAMETERIZATION
In this section, we introduce our careful selection of the parameters
{(as ,bs )|s ∈ S} in order to ensure that eseus achieves good per-
formance. To simplify our analysis, we assume that each worker
s’s cost function Cs (·) is linear in δs ∈ [δ s ,δ s ], i.e.,
Cs (δs ) = −cs,1δs + cs,2, ∀δs ∈ [δ s , δ s ], (15)
where cs,1 and cs,2 are positive parameters. Note that such selec-
tion of each worker s’s cost function conforms to the requirement
that her cost should decrease with the increase of δs .
According to howmuch prior knowledge the platformhas about
workers’ cost functions, we parameterize eseus in the following
two scenarios, namely the complete information scenariowhere the
platform knows exactly each worker s’s cs,1 and cs,2 (Section 6.1),
as well as the incomplete information scenario where only limited
information about cs,1 and cs,2 is known by the platform (Section
6.2). In both scenarios, we assume that δ1,δ2, · · · ,δS , i.e, the lower
bounds of workers’ δs ’s, are i.i.d. random variables within the
range [δ ,δ ] with PDF f (·). Furthermore, the PDF f (·) is assumed
to be a priori known by the platform and workers, which, as will be
shown in Section 6.1.2 and 6.2.2, is the only prior statistical knowl-
edge needed to evaluate workers’ expected utilities.
6.1 Complete Information Scenario
6.1.1 Parameter Selection
As aforementioned, in this section, we assume that the platform
knows exactly both cs,1 and cs,2 in each worker s’s cost function.
Although, in practice, it might be hard for the platform to obtain
such exact knowledge, the complete information scenario is still
relevant and interesting to study, because it sheds light upon the
philosophy of parameterizing eseus in the incomplete informa-
tion scenario in Section 6.2. For any given ∆t ∈ [δ ,δ ], we can
parameterize eseus with any set of parameters {(as ,bs )|s ∈ S}
that satisfy Condition (16)-(18).
as ≥
cs,1
2δ
, ∀s ∈ S (16)
bs = as
(
∆
2
t +A(∆t )
) − cs,1∆t + cs,2, ∀s ∈ S (17)
S∑
s=1
bs ≤ B +
S∑
s=1
2asδ
2
, (18)
where A(∆t ) =
∫
∆t
δ
u2
f (u)∫
∆t
δ
f (v)dv
du . e criterion of selecting the
additional parameter ∆t will be discussed in Section 6.1.2 as we an-
alyze the performance guarantees of the parameter selection given
by Condition (16)-(18). For each s ∈ S, as bs is exactly determined
by as due to Condition (17), one way of parameter selection is to
choose an as ≥ cs,12δ such that Condition (18) is satisfied.
6.1.2 Analysis
In this section, we carry out analyses about the desirable properties
of eseus by parameterizing it according to Condition (16)-(18).
We derive the BNE of the sensing game that corresponds to such
parameterization in the following eorem 1.
Theorem 1. If parameters {(as ,bs )|s ∈ S} satisfy Condition (16)
and (17) , we have that δ∗ = (δ∗1 ,δ∗2 , · · · ,δ∗S ), where, for each worker
s ∈ S,
δ∗s =
{⊥, if δ s > ∆t
δ s , if δ s ≤ ∆t
, (19)
is a BNE of the sensing game in the complete information scenario.
Proof. If any worker s chooses to participate, her expected
utility, when other workers take strategies δ∗−s , and her reference
worker r ’s strategy δ∗r is given, can be calculated as
E
[
us (δs , δ∗−s )
δ∗r ] =E[ps (X(δs , δ∗−s )) δ∗r ] −Cs (δs )
=bs − asE
[
1
M
M∑
m=1
(
X sm − X rm
)2δ∗r
]
+ cs,1δs − cs,2.
AsX sm−X rm =
(
X truth+N (0,δ2s )
)− (X truth+N (0,δ2r )) = N (0,δ2s )−
N (0,δ2r ), we have E
[(X sm − X rm )2] = δ2s + δ2r . erefore, we have
E
[
us (δs ,δ∗−s )
δ∗r ] = bs − as (δ2s + (δ∗r )2) + cs,1δs − cs,2,
and thus,
max
{cs,1
2as
, δ s
}
= arg max
δs ∈[δ s ,δ s ]
E
[
us (δs , δ∗−s )
δ∗r ] .
at is, regardless of the value of δ∗r , the strategy δs ∈ [δ s ,δ s ] that
maximizes E
[
us (δs , δ∗−s )
δ∗r ] is the maximum between cs,12as and δ s .
Because of Condition (16), we have that δ s ≥ δ ≥
cs,1
2as
. erefore,
if any worker s chooses to participate, her strategy must be δ s , and
thus, her expected utility is
E
[
us (δ s, δ∗−s )
]
=Eδ ∗r
[
E
[
us (δ s, δ∗−s )
δ ∗r ] ] = Eδ r [E[us (δ s, δ∗−s )δ r ]]
=Eδ
r
[
bs − as
(
δ 2
s
+ δ 2
r
)
+ cs,1δ s − cs,2
]
=bs − as
(
δ 2
s
+ Eδ
r
[
δ 2
r
δ
r
≤ ∆t
] )
+ cs,1δ s − cs,2
=
(
as
(
∆
2
t + A(∆t )
) − cs,1∆t + cs,2)−(
as
(
δ 2
s
+ A(∆t )
) − cs,1δ s + cs,2),
where A(∆t ) =
∫
∆t
δ
u2
f (u)∫
∆t
δ
f (v)dv
du , and the last equality is due to
Condition (17). erefore, we have that for each worker s ∈ S{
E
[
us (δ s , δ∗−s )
]
< 0, if δ s > ∆t
E
[
us (δ s , δ∗−s )
] ≥ 0, if δ s ≤ ∆t ,
and thus, given that other workers take the strategies δ∗−s , worker
s will drop out, if δ s > ∆t , and will take strategy δ s , if δ s ≤ ∆t .
Hence, the strategy profile δ∗ given in eorem 1 is a BNE of the
sensing game. 
eorem 1 gives us a BNE of the sensing game, where every
worker s with δ s > ∆t will voluntarily drop out, and as long as
δ s ≤ ∆t , the worker s will participate with strategy δ s , which is
exactly the smallest standard deviation of the difference between
her data and the ground truths. at is, by satisfying Condition (16)
and (17), eseus will only incentivize workers who potentially is
capable of providing high quality data to participate, and those
who choose to participate will exert their maximum amount of ef-
fort, leading them to provide reliable data. Note that there might
be multiple BNEs for the sensing game. However, to the best of
our knowledge, we have not found other BNEs except for the one
given in eorem 1, on which our further analyses in this section
are based. We leave the derivation of other BNEs or the proof of
the uniqueness of BNE in our future work. Next, we prove in the
followingeorem 2 thateseus satisfies budget feasibility in the
complete information scenario by satisfying Condition (18).
Theorem 2. Condition (18) ensures thateseus is budget feasible
in the complete information scenario.
Proof. At the BNE δ∗ given ineorem 1, the expected overall
payment satisfies that
E
[ ∑
s∈S′
ps
(
X(δ∗)) ] = ∑
s∈S′
E
[
ps
(
X(δ∗)) ]
=
∑
s∈S′
(
− as
(
δ 2
s
+ E
[
δ 2
rs
δ
rs
≤ ∆t
] )
+ bs
)
≤
S∑
s=1
( − 2asδ 2 + bs ) ≤ S∑
s=1
( − 2asδ 2 + 2asδ 2) + B = B,
where the last inequality is because of Condition (18), which ex-
actly proves that eseus is budget feasible in the complete infor-
mation scenario. 
Clearly, as stated in the following eorem 3, eseus satisfies
individual rationality in the complete information scenario.
Theorem 3. eseus is individual rational in the complete infor-
mation scenario.
Proof. eorem 3 is an obvious fact, which directly follows
from the fact that only workers with non-negative expected utili-
ties at the BNE will choose to participate. Hence, no worker will
have negative utility, and thus, individual rationality is satisfied in
the complete information scenario. 
Next, we discuss our selection criterion of the parameter ∆t .
Following notational conventions in order statistics, we denote
δ (1) = min{δ1,δ2, · · · , δS }. We assume that the CDF F (·) of any
δ s is invertible, and its inverse is F
−1(·). Based oneorem 1, if ∆t
is set to be too small, no workers will participate at the BNE. us,
we establish a lower bound for ∆t in the following eorem 4.
Theorem 4. Given any θc ∈ (0, 1), if ∆t ≥ F−1
(
1 − S√1 − θc
)
,
then Pr
(
δ (1) ≤ ∆t
) ≥ θc , i.e., the probability that at least one worker
chooses to participate at the BNE of the sensing game, in the complete
information scenario, is no less than the threshold θc .
Proof. For any given ∆t , we have that
Pr
(
δ (1) ≤ ∆t
)
= Pr
(
min{δ1,δ2, · · · , δS } ≤ ∆t
)
= 1 − Pr(min{δ1, δ2, · · · ,δS } > ∆t )
= 1 −
S∏
s=1
Pr
(
δ s > ∆t
)
= 1 − (1 − F (∆t ))S .
us, for any θc ∈ (0, 1), we get ∆t ≥ F−1
(
1− S√1 − θc
)
by seing
1 − (1 − F (∆t ))S ≥ θc , which proves eorem 4. 
In the rest of our analyses, we use APP to denote the the value
of the PMD problem’s objective function guaranteed by eseus.
eorem 4 gives us that if ∆t ≥ F−1
(
1 − S√1 − θc
)
, the probability
that there exists at least one participating worker at the BNE of
the sensing game is guaranteed to be no less than the predefined
threshold θc ∈ (0, 1). However, this does not mean that ∆t could
be infinitely large, because the greater ∆t is, the farther APP will
dri apart from the minimum value of the PMD problem’s objec-
tive function. us, in the following eorem 5, we derive an up-
per bound for the parameter ∆t . Note that for any payment mech-
anism that ensures the participation of at least one worker, the
minimum possible value for the objective function is OPT = δ (1),
which is the optimal benchmark that we compare APP with.
Theorem 5. In the complete information scenario, given αc > 1
and βc ∈ (0, 1), we have that
Pr
(
APP
OPT
≥ αc
)
≤ βc , (20)
if ∆t ≤ ∆t , where ∆t is the solution to
∆t +
√
− 2
S ln βc
(
R
(
∆t
)
S − δαc
)
= 0, (21)
with R
(
∆t
)
=
∫
∆t
δ
u
f (u)∫
∆t
δ
f (v)dv
du .
Proof. At the BNE δ∗ given in eorem 1, we have that
APP =
∑
s ∈S′
δ∗s =
∑
s ∈S′
δ s =
S∑
s=1
δ s1{δ s ≤∆t },
where, for each s ∈ S, 1{δ
s
≤∆t } is an indicator function, such that
1{δ
s
≤∆t } =
{
0, if δ s > ∆t
1, if δ s ≤ ∆t
,
and thus, δ s1{δ s ≤∆t } ∈ [0,∆t ]. us, for a fixed αc > 1, we have
Pr
(
APP
OPT
≥ αc
)
=Pr
( ∑
S
s=1 δ s1{δ s≤∆t }
δ (1)
≥ αc
)
≤ Pr
(∑
S
s=1 δ s1{δ s≤∆t }
δ
≥ αc
)
=Pr
( ∑
S
s=1
(
δ
s
1{δ
s
≤∆t } − E[δ s |δ s ≤ ∆t ]
)
S
≥ αcδ
S
− E[δ 1δ 1 ≤ ∆t ]
)
≤ exp
(
− 2S
2
( αc δ
S
− E[δ 1 |δ 1 ≤ ∆t ]
)2
S∆2
t
)
= exp
(
− 2(αcδ − R(∆t )S )
2
S∆2
t
)
,
where the last inequality is because of the Hoeffding’s inequality,
and R(∆t ) =
∫
∆t
δ
u
f (u)∫
∆t
δ
f (v)dv
du . For a fixed βc ∈ (0, 1), by seing
exp
(
− 2(αcδ−R(∆t )S )
2
S∆2
t
)
≤ βc , we get that ∆t +
√
− 2
S ln βc
(
R(∆t )S −
δαc
) ≤ 0. erefore, by seing ∆t to be no greater than the upper
bound ∆t given in eorem 5, we have Pr
( APP
OPT ≥ αc
) ≤ βc . 
By eorem 5, we have that, as long as ∆t ≤ ∆t , the probabil-
ity that the approximation ratio APPOPT ≥ αc is no greater than βc ,
for the predefined constants αc > 1 and βc ∈ (0, 1). is shows
the probabilistic guarantee on the approximation ratio of eseus
compared to the optimal payment mechanism. Next, we have the
following Corollary 1 about the range from which the parameter
∆t should be selected.
Corollary 1. By jointly considering eorem 4 and 5, the pa-
rameter ∆t should satisfy that F
−1 (1 − S√1 − θc ) ≤ ∆t ≤ ∆t in
the complete information scenario, in order to guarantee that with
high probability there exist participating workers at the correspond-
ing BNE (eorem 4), and that with high probability eseus has a
small approximation ratio (eorem 5).
6.2 Incomplete Information Scenario
6.2.1 Parameter Selection
In this section, we study a more practical incomplete informa-
tion scenario, where the platform does not know the exact val-
ues of each worker s’s cs,1 and cs,2, but instead, only knows that
cs,1 ∈ [c1, c1], and cs,2 ∈ [c2, c2], for each worker s . In this case,
given any ∆l and ∆h , such that δ ≤ ∆l < ∆h ≤ δ , we can param-
eterize eseus with any set of parameters {(as ,bs )|s ∈ S} such
that Condition (22)-(25) are satisfied.

as ≥ c1
2δ
, ∀s ∈ S (22)
bs ≤ as
(
∆
2
h
+A(∆h)
) − c1∆h + c2, ∀s ∈ S (23)
bs ≥ as
(
∆
2
l
+A(∆h)
) − c1∆l + c2, , ∀s ∈ S (24)
S∑
s=1
bs ≤ B +
S∑
s=1
2asδ
2
, (25)
where A(∆h) =
∫
∆h
δ
u2
f (u)∫
∆h
δ
f (v)dv
du . Note that the criterion of se-
lecting ∆l and ∆h will be discussed in Section 6.2.2 as we introduce
the corresponding analyses. Given these conditions, one specific
way of parameter selection for each s ∈ S is to choose an as ≥ c12δ
such that Condition (22)-(25) are satisfied.
6.2.2 Analysis
In this section, we firstly characterize the BNE of the sensing game
by parameterizingeseus in the incomplete information scenario
according to Condition (22)-(25) in the following eorem 6.
Theorem 6. If parameters {(as ,bs )|s ∈ S} satisfy Condition (22)-
(24) , we have a BNE δ∗ = (δ∗1 ,δ∗2 , · · · ,δ∗S ) of the sensing game in the
incomplete information scenario, such that, for each worker s ∈ S,
δ∗s =
{⊥, if δ s > ∆h
δ s , if δ s ≤ ∆l
. (26)
Proof. From Condition (22), we have that δ s ≥ δ ≥ c12as ≥
cs,1
2as
for each worker s . us, based on exactly the same reasoning as in
the proof of eorem 1, if a worker s chooses to participate when
other workers take strategies δ∗−s , her strategy must be δ s .
erefore, given that other workers take strategies δ∗−s , worker
s’s expected utility is
E
[
us (δ s , δ∗−s )
]
= bs − as
(
δ2s + E
[
δ2r
δ r ≤ ∆h ] ) + cs,1δ s − cs,2
= bs − as
(
δ2s +A(∆h)
)
+ cs,1δ s − cs,2.
us, by Condition (23), for any worker s with δ s > ∆h , we
have that
E
[
us (δ s , δ∗−s )
] ≤ (as (∆2h +A(∆h)) − c1∆h + c2)−(
as
(
δ2s +A(∆h)
) − cs,1δ s + cs,2) < 0
and by Condition (24), for any worker s with δ s ≤ ∆l , we have
that
E
[
us (δ s , δ∗−s )
] ≥ (as (∆2l +A(∆h)) − c1∆l + c2)−(
as
(
δ2s +A(∆h)
) − cs,1δ s + cs,2) ≥ 0.
us, given that other workers take strategies δ∗−s , worker s will
drop out, if δ s > ∆h , and will take strategy δ s , if δ s ≤ ∆l . Hence,
there exists a BNE δ∗ of the sensing game such that Equation (26)
is satisfied for each worker s . 
eorem 6 characterizes a BNE of the sensing game, where each
worker s with δ s > ∆h will drop out, and as long as δ s ≤ ∆l ,
she will participate with strategy δ s . Note that, at the BNE, each
worker s with δ s ∈ (∆l ,∆h] has to evaluate her expected utility
based on the specific choice of {(as ,bs )|s ∈ S} in order to make
the decision of whether or not to participate. All of the following
analyses in this section are based on the BNE characterized ine-
orem 6. We also leave the proof of the uniqueness of BNE or the
derivation of other BNEs in our future work. Next, we introduce
in eorem 7 and 8 about the budget feasibility and individual ra-
tionality of eseus in the incomplete information scenario.
Theorem7. Condition (25) ensures thateseus is budget feasible
in the incomplete information scenario.
Theorem 8. eseus is individual rational in the incomplete in-
formation scenario.
e proof of eorem 7 is the same as that of eorem 2 except
that the ∆t is replaced by ∆h , and the proof ofeorem 8 is exactly
identical to that of eorem 3. us, we omit the formal proofs of
eorem 7 and 8 in this paper. Similar to Section 6.1.2, we estab-
lish ranges from which we select parameters ∆l and ∆h . In the
following eorem 9, we introduce a lower bound for ∆l .
Theorem 9. Given any θic ∈ (0, 1), if ∆l ≥ F−1
(
1 − S√1 − θic
)
,
then Pr
(
δ (1) ≤ ∆l
) ≥ θic , i.e., the probability that at least one worker
chooses to participate at the BNE of the sensing game, in the incom-
plete information scenario, is no less than the threshold θic .
e proof of eorem 9 is omied in this paper as well, because
it can be directly adapted from that of eorem 4 by changing ∆t
to ∆l and θc to θic . Byeorem 9, we have that, in the incomplete
information scenario, it is ∆l that decides the probability that at
least one worker chooses to participate at the BNE of the sensing
game. at is, as long as ∆l ≥ F−1
(
1 − S√1 − θic
)
, this probability,
i.e., Pr
(
δ (1) ≤ ∆l
)
, will be no less than the predefined threshold θic .
Next, in the following eorem 10, where APP and OPT have the
same meanings as ineorem 5, we derive an upper bound for the
parameter ∆h .
Theorem10. In the incomplete information scenario, givenαic >
1 and βic ∈ (0, 1), we have that
Pr
(
APP
OPT
≥ αic
)
≤ βic , (27)
if ∆h ≤ ∆h , where ∆h is the solution to
∆h +
√
− 2
S ln βic
(
R
(
∆h
)
S − δαic
)
= 0,
with R
(
∆h
)
=
∫
∆h
δ
u
f (u)∫ ∆
h
δ
f (v)dv
du .
Proof. At the BNE δ∗ of the sensing game characterized ine-
orem 6, we have that
APP =
∑
s ∈S′
δ s ≤
S∑
s=1
δ s1{δ s ≤∆h },
where, for each s ∈ S, 1{δ
s
≤∆h } is an indicator function, such that
1{δ
s
≤∆h } =
{
0, if δ s > ∆h
1, if δ s ≤ ∆h
.
us, similar to the proof of eorem 5, for a fixed αic > 1, we
have that
Pr
(
APP
OPT
≥ αic
)
≤ Pr
(∑S
s=1 δ s1{δ s ≤∆h }
δ (1)
≥ αic
)
≤ exp
(
− 2(αicδ − R(∆h)S)
2
S∆2
h
)
,
where R(∆h) =
∫
∆h
δ
u
f (u)∫
∆h
δ
f (v)dv
du . us, for any fixed βic ∈
(0, 1), by seing exp
(
− 2(αicδ−R(∆h)S )
2
S∆2
h
)
≤ βic , we get ∆h +√
− 2
S ln βic
(
R(∆h)S − δαic
) ≤ 0. erefore, by seing ∆h to be
no greater than the upper bound ∆h given ineorem 10, we have
that Pr
( APP
OPT ≥ αic
) ≤ βic . 
Similar to eorem 5, eorem 10 gives us a probabilistic guar-
antee on the approximation ratio of eseus compared to the opti-
mal payment mechanism in the incomplete information scenario.
at is, as long as ∆h ≤ ∆h , the probability that the approximation
ratio APPOPT ≥ αic is no greater than βic , for the predefined constants
αic > 1 and βic ∈ (0, 1). Next, we introduce in Corollary 2 about
the ranges from which we select the parameters ∆l and ∆h .
Corollary 2. By jointly considering eorem 9 and 10, in the
incomplete information scenario, the parameters ∆l and ∆h should
satisfy F−1
(
1 − S√1 − θic
) ≤ ∆l < ∆h ≤ ∆h , in order to guaran-
tee, with high probability, the existence of at least one participating
worker at the corresponding BNE (eorem 9), and that with high
probability eseus yields a small approximation ratio (eorem 10).
6.3 Summary of Parameterization
us far, we have finished our discussion of parameterizing e-
seus in both the complete (Section 6.1) and incomplete (Section
6.2) information scenario. In summary, in the complete informa-
tion scenario, if parameters {(as ,bs )|s ∈ S} and ∆t satisfy Con-
dition (16)-(18) and Corollary 1, at the BNE derived in eorem 1,
eseus satisfies budget feasibility (eorem 2), individual ratio-
nality (eorem 3), as well as with high probability it has a small
approximation ratio (eorem 5), and with high probability it guar-
antees that there exist participating workers (eorem 4). Simi-
larly, in the incomplete information scenario, if we set parameters
{(as ,bs )|s ∈ S}, ∆l , and ∆h according to Condition (22)-(25) and
Corollary 2, at the BNE characterized in eorem 6, eseus also
satisfies budget feasibility (eorem 7), individual rationality (e-
orem 8), as well as with high probability it guarantees that there
will be participating workers (eorem 9), and with high probabil-
ity it has a small approximation ratio (eorem 10).
7 PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we introduce the baseline methods, as well as sim-
ulation seings and results.
7.1 Baseline Methods
In the first baseline method, called Max Std, considered in this pa-
per, each worker s takes strategy δ s , i.e., the maximum standard
deviation of the difference between her data and the ground truths.
Max Std actually corresponds to the family of payment mecha-
nisms that provide rather insufficient incentives so that workers
are only willing to spend lile amount of effort. Different from
Max Std, in the second baseline method, called Random Std, each
worker s selects her strategy δs uniformly at random from the
range [δs ,δ s ]. We compare these two baseline methods with the
BNEs of the sensing game induced by eseus in both the com-
plete and incomplete information scenario, which are established
in eorem 1 and 6, respectively. Note that we do not compare
eseus with existing mechanisms in past literature, because, as
indicated in Section 2, none of them consider the same scenario as
this paper, and thus they are not comparable with eseus.
7.2 Simulation Settings
For the complete information scenario, we consider seing I and
II given in Table 1. In both of these two seings, for each worker
s , δ s is generated uniformly at random from the range [0.1, 4], i.e.,
δ s ∼ U [0.1, 4]. Furthermore, we set θc = 0.9, αc = 5, and βc = 0.1,
and generate δ s and x
truth
m uniformly at random from the range
[5, 10] and [0, 10], respectively. In seing I, we fix the number of
tasks as M = 30 and vary the number of workers S from 120 to
150, whereas in seing II, we fix the number of workers as S =
130 and vary the number of tasks M from 10 to 40. Note that the
parameter ∆t is generated uniformly at random from the range
[F−1(1 − S√1 − θc ),∆t ]. In seing III and IV for the incomplete
information scenario, we generate the parameters δ s , δ s , θic , αic ,
βic , x
truth
m , S , and M in the same way as in seing I and II, and
select ∆l and ∆h uniformly at random from the range [F−1(1 −
S
√
1 − θic ),∆h ] such that ∆l < ∆h .
Seing δ
s
δ s θc , θic αc , αic βc , βic x
truth
m S M
I, III [0.1, 4] [5, 10] 0.9 5 0.1 [0, 10] [120, 150] 30
II, IV [0.1, 4] [5, 10] 0.9 5 0.1 [0, 10] 130 [10, 40]
Table 1: Simulation settings
In all these seings, given δs and x
truth
m , worker s’s data on task
m, which is xsm , is generated by adding a randomly sampled noise
from the distribution N (0,δ2s ) to the ground truth xtruthm . en,
workers’ data generated by Max Std and Random Std, as well as at
the BNEs of the sensing game induced by eseus, are treated as
the inputs to a truth discovery algorithm, respectively, to calculate
the estimated ground truths. In our simulation, the truth discovery
algorithm thatwe implement is thewidely adoptedCRH [7], which
calculates each participating worker s’s weight ws as
ws = log
(∑
s ′∈S′
∑
m∈M |xs
′
m − x∗m |2∑
m∈M |xsm − x∗m |2
)
. (29)
7.3 Simulation Results
In this section, we firstly demonstrate our simulation results re-
garding the comparison amongMax Std, Random Std, andeseus,
in terms of the truth discovery algorithm CRH’s MAEs (defined in
Definition 6), in Figure 2-5. Note that for each specific worker and
task number, we repeatedly generate workers’ data, run the truth
discovery algorithm CRH, and calculate the corresponding MAE
for 10000 times.
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Figure 2: MAE comparison
(setting I)
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Figure 3: MAE comparison
(setting II)
In Figure 2 and 3, we plot the means and standard deviations of
the MAEs corresponding to Max Std, Random Std, andeseus for
seing I and II of the complete information scenario. From these
two figures, it is easily observable that the means and standard
deviations of the MAEs that correspond to eseus are far less
than those that correspond to Max Std and Random Std, which
is because eseus incentivizes workers to exert their maximum
amount of effort, so that the standard deviation between each
worker’s data and the ground truths isminimized. Note that, in Fig-
ure 2, themean ofMAE largely decreases as the number of workers
increase, becausemore data that are close to the ground truths will
be inpued to CRH with more number of workers. Figure 4 and
5 demonstrate similar trends for the MAEs in seing III and IV of
the incomplete information scenario.
Basically, Figure 2-5 indicate collectively that a truth discovery
algorithm will return rather inaccurate aggregated results, when a
vast majority of the participating workers provide unreliable data.
erefore, our eseus payment mechanism is highly necessary
in order to achieve high aggregation accuracy, even though the
platform aggregates workers’ data using a state-of-the-art truth
discovery algorithm.
8 CONCLUSION
In conclusion, in this paper, we propose a payment mechanism,
called eseus, which is used in pair with a truth discovery algo-
rithm to ensure high aggregation accuracy in MCS systems where
workers may strategically reduce their sensing effort. eseus
tackles workers’ strategic behavior, and incentivizes workers to
spend their maximum possible effort at the BNE of the induced
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Figure 4: MAE comparison
(setting III)
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Figure 5: MAE comparison
(setting IV)
sensing game among workers. Furthermore, we ensure that e-
seus bears other desirable properties, including individual rational-
ity and budget feasibility. e desirable properties of eseus are
validated through theoretical analysis, and extensive simulations.
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